

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

8 Mar 81

DDI 1783-82

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Henry S. Rowen
Chairman

SUBJECT: Request for Signature of Covering Letter to
Cabinet-level Officers

The Memorandum to Holders-II of SNIE 6-78 on nuclear terrorism is now ready for dissemination. This is to request your signature on the covering letter for the copies going to the Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Director, OMB. (I am sending copies to selected sub-cabinet officials.)

Henry S. Rowen

Henry S. Rowen

Attachment :
As Stated

61

DDI 1783-82

SUBJECT: Request for Signature of Covering Letter to
Cabinet-level Officers

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee
1 - Exec. Registry
1 - DDI
1 - Chrnm, NIC
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

The Vice President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. Vice President:

The Intelligence Community has completed an updated assessment (enclosed) of the likelihood and implications of terrorist actions against US nuclear weapon sites. The message of this assessment is that the threat is ~~to~~ ^{so} serious that every precaution is called for.

We know from the debriefing of General Dozier that his Red Brigade captors zeroed in on targeting information about US nuclear weapons sites. The value of even an unsuccessful attack on a nuclear weapons facility is enhancing anxieties in Western Europe that some terrorists groups may make such attempts.

We held a two day meeting of our Station chiefs in Europe last week, with U.S. Army personnel in attendance for part of it, to pass on the lessons of the Dozier kidnapping and the higher attention which must be given the threat to nuclear facilities. The main lesson of the Dozier rescue, our chiefs concluded, was the importance of our Stations working closely with the local police and of tightening the ties between neighboring Stations--and their relationships with local liaison services--to deal more effectively with defensive and rescue needs.

Respectfully yours,


William J. Casey

Enclosure

Memo to Holders-II of SNIE 6-78

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520


Dear Al:

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Respectfully yours,



William J. Casey

Enclosure
Memo to Holders-II of SNIE 6-78

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

Honorable Casper W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301


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William J. Casey

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Memo to Holders-II of SNIE 6-78

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

Honorable David A. Stockman
Director
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D.C. 20503


Dear Dave:

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Memo to Holders-II of SNIE 6-78

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

Honorable James B. Edwards
Secretary of Energy
US Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585


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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535


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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

Honorable Donald T. Regan
Secretary of Treasury
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20220


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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 1982

General David C. Jones
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301


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